Hybrid expressivists claim to solve the Frege–Geach problem by offloading the explanation of the logico-semantic properties of moral sentences onto the belief-components of hybrid states they express. We argue that this strategy is undermined by one of hybrid expressivism's own commitments: That the truth of the belief-component is neither necessary nor sufficient for the truth of the hybrid state it composes. We articulate a new approach. Instead of explaining head-on what it is for, say, a pair of moral sentences to be inconsistent, expressivists should ‘sidestep’ and explain what it is to think that a pair of moral sentences is inconsistent. To think so is to think they cannot both be true—a modal notion. Since expressivists have given accounts of such modals, we illustrate how sentences like ‘‘‘lying is wrong’’ and ‘‘lying is not wrong’’ are inconsistent’ express sensible—and rationally compelling—states of mind.

中文翻译：

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回避 Frege–Geach 问题

混合表达主义者声称通过将道德句子的逻辑语义属性的解释卸载到他们表达的混合状态的信念成分上来解决弗雷格-吉奇问题。我们认为，这种策略被混合表现主义自己的一个承诺所破坏：信念成分的真实性对于它所构成的混合状态的真实性来说既不是必要的也不是充分的。我们阐明了一种新方法。与其正面解释一对道德句子不一致是什么，表现主义者应该“回避”并解释认为一对道德句子不一致是什么意思。这么想就是认为它们不能同时为真——一个模态概念。由于表现主义者已经给出了此类模态的说明，