Do participants in shared activity have mutual obligations to do their bit? This article shows this question has no one-size-fits-all answer and offers a pluralist account of the normativity of shared agency. The first part argues obligations to do one's bit have three degrees of involvement in shared activity. Such obligations might, obviously, bolster co-participants’ resolve to act as planned (degree 1). Less obviously, there also are higher and lower degrees of involvement. Obligations to do one's bit might provide our agency-pooling mechanism. When they do, we act together by virtue of satisfying them (degree 2). Conversely, some shared activities involve no obligation (degree 0). In the second part, I argue shared agency theory is best served by a non-moralistic conception of obligation, one on which co-participants’ obligations need be neither strict-performance obligations, nor directed ones. Overall, my arguments suggest that we can choose how to coordinate normatively our shared activities.

中文翻译：

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共享代理和相互义务：一个多元化的账户

共享活动的参与者是否有共同义务尽自己的一份力量？本文表明这个问题没有放之四海而皆准的答案，并提供了对共享机构规范性的多元解释。第一部分论证了尽一份力的义务在参与共享活动方面具有三种程度。显然，此类义务可能会增强共同参与者按计划行事的决心（等级 1）。不太明显的是，参与程度也有高低之分。尽一份力的义务可能会提供我们的代理池机制。当他们这样做时，我们通过满足他们而一起行动（第 2 级）。相反，一些共享活动不涉及义务（0 级）。在第二部分，我认为共享代理理论最适合非道德主义的义务概念，共同参与者的义务既不是严格履行义务，也不是定向义务。总的来说，我的论点表明我们可以选择如何规范地协调我们的共同活动。