There can be many vacant private parking spaces near locations of excess parking demand. How can we provide the right incentives to potential suppliers and demanders so that they are shared in the market? We consider a parking-sharing platform in which each agent supplies a parking space and needs another one. We propose a novel parking-sharing mechanism that amends the well-known Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction with the notion of scale control, which ex-ante constrains the number of agents who are offered a parking space by the platform. We show that such a mechanism is incentive compatible and individually rational. We illustrate that it can easily achieve budget balance with a proper choice of scale. We also extend our auction to include only suppliers and only demanders in addition to the agents who are simultaneously suppliers and demanders.

在停车需求过剩的地点附近可能有许多空置的私人停车位。我们如何为潜在的供应商和需求者提供正确的激励措施，以便他们在市场上共享？我们考虑一个停车共享平台，其中每个代理提供一个停车位并需要另一个停车位。我们提出了一种新颖的停车共享机制，该机制用规模控制的概念修改了著名的 Vickrey–Clarke–Groves 拍卖，该机制事前限制了平台提供停车位的代理人的数量。我们表明，这种机制是激励相容的并且是个人理性的。我们说明，它可以通过适当的规模选择轻松实现预算平衡。除了同时是供应商和需求方的代理人之外，我们还将拍卖范围扩大到仅包括供应商和需求方。