If we want to retain classical logic and standard syntax in light of the liar, we are forced to restrict the T-schema. The traditional philosophical justification for this is sentential – liar sentences somehow malfunction. But the standard formal way of implementing this is conditional, our T-sentences tell us that if “p” does not malfunction, then “p” is true if and only if p. Recently Bacon and others have pointed out that conditional T-restrictions like this flirt with incoherence. If we want to keep the “malfunction” motivation, our only other option is to non-conditionally restrict the T-schema, but Field and others have given powerful philosophical and technical arguments against this kind of approach. Here I argue that if we really take the philosophical motivation for restricting T-sentences seriously, we can explain why conditional restrictions fail, answer Field's argument, and reason in a coherent way about truth using a non-conditional restriction strategy. This cracks the door open for a fully classical response to the liar and related paradoxes. In closing, I argue that, when properly understood, this kind of “restriction” is not really a restriction at all. If this is right, then the holy grail of liar studies (classical logic, naïve truth, and standard syntax) may yet be attainable.

中文翻译：

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限制T-schema解决骗子问题

如果我们想根据骗子的观点保留经典逻辑和标准语法，我们就不得不限制 T 模式。对此的传统哲学理由是句子——说谎的句子在某种程度上出现了故障。但实现这一点的标准形式方法是有条件的，我们的 T 语句告诉我们，如果“ p ”没有发生故障，那么“ p ”当且仅当p时才为真。最近培根和其他人指出，像这样的有条件的 T 限制是不连贯的。如果我们想保留“故障”动机，我们唯一的选择就是无条件地限制 T 模式，但 Field 和其他人已经给出了反对这种方法的强有力的哲学和技术论据。在这里我认为，如果我们真的认真对待限制 T 句的哲学动机，我们就可以解释为什么条件限制失败，回答菲尔德的论点，并使用非条件限制策略以连贯的方式推理真理。这为对说谎者和相关悖论进行完全经典的反应打开了大门。最后，我认为，如果正确理解的话，这种“限制”根本就不是真正的限制。如果这是正确的，那么说谎者研究的圣杯（经典逻辑、朴素真理和标准语法）也许是可以实现的。