We provide new evidence of sign asymmetry in dividend payout policy in the postwar period in the U.S. Using a nonlinear autoregressive distributed lag model, we show that managers: (i) smooth the time-path of dividends relative to earnings; (ii) target a higher long-run payout ratio when earnings increase than when they decrease; and (iii) cut dividends faster than they raise dividends. Our findings are consistent with existing research on the implications of agency problems and signaling effects for payout policy.

中文翻译：

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股息对盈利消息的不对称反应


我们提供了美国战后时期股息支付政策符号不对称的新证据。使用非线性自回归分布式滞后模型，我们表明管理者：（i）平滑股息相对于收益的时间路径； (ii) 在盈利增加时设定比盈利减少时更高的长期派息率； (iii) 削减股息的速度快于提高股息的速度。我们的研究结果与关于代理问题的影响和支付政策信号效应的现有研究是一致的。