In a platform economy, alongside the traditional reselling channel, online intermediaries (e.g., Amazon and JD.com) open their platforms to allow manufacturers to distribute products directly to consumers via an agency channel, i.e., platform openness. This paper investigates the implications of platform openness when a manufacturer possesses product quality information unknown to the online intermediary. We analyze a signaling game between a manufacturer and an online intermediary, in which the better-informed manufacturer first sets the wholesale price, which it may use to signal private quality information. Based on the wholesale price, the intermediary decides what quantity of the product to sell through the reselling channel. Finally, if the intermediary opens its platform, the manufacturer decides what quantity of the product to sell through the agency channel. We find that the effects of platform openness on the manufacturer and the online intermediary depend on three model parameters: the commission rate, the degree of channel substitution, and the degree of quality differentiation. Interestingly, information sharing may narrow the region of the win–win outcome in which platform openness benefits both intermediary and manufacturer, which differs from the situation in which the online intermediary is better informed than the manufacturer. Moreover, the online intermediary cannot always induce the manufacturer to share quality information through platform openness; similarly, platform openness may even decrease the value of information sharing for the online intermediary.

在平台经济中，除了传统的转售渠道外，在线中介（例如亚马逊和京东) 开放平台，让厂商通过代理渠道直接向消费​​者配送产品，即平台开放。本文研究了当制造商拥有在线中介未知的产品质量信息时平台开放性的影响。我们分析了制造商和在线中介之间的信号博弈，其中消息灵通的制造商首先设定批发价，它可能会用它来传递私人质量信息。根据批发价，中介决定通过转售渠道销售的产品数量。最后，如果中介开放其平台，厂商决定通过代理渠道销售多少产品。我们发现平台开放度对厂商和网络中介的影响取决于三个模型参数：佣金率、渠道替代度和质量差异化度。有趣的是，信息共享可能会缩小平台开放对中介和制造商都有利的双赢结果区域，这不同于在线中介比制造商更知情的情况。而且，在线中介也不能总是通过平台开放来诱导制造商共享质量信息；同样，平台开放甚至可能降低在线中介的信息共享价值。有趣的是，信息共享可能会缩小平台开放对中介和制造商都有利的双赢结果区域，这不同于在线中介比制造商更知情的情况。而且，在线中介也不能总是通过平台开放来诱导制造商共享质量信息；同样，平台开放甚至可能降低在线中介的信息共享价值。有趣的是，信息共享可能会缩小平台开放对中介和制造商都有利的双赢结果区域，这不同于在线中介比制造商更知情的情况。而且，在线中介也不能总是通过平台开放来诱导制造商共享质量信息；同样，平台开放甚至可能降低在线中介的信息共享价值。在线中介不能总是通过平台开放来诱导制造商共享质量信息；同样，平台开放甚至可能降低在线中介的信息共享价值。在线中介不能总是通过平台开放来诱导制造商共享质量信息；同样，平台开放甚至可能降低在线中介的信息共享价值。