Negotiations between manufacturers and retailers often go sour. In an attempt to stand their ground, firms increasingly exercise coercive power and decide to delist products until the conflict is resolved. Using an event study, this paper provides knowledge on the performance implications of these so-called conflict delistings. While the results show that, on average, conflict delistings severely damage firm value, the direction and magnitude of the stock market reaction is contingent upon conflict and firm characteristics. Conflict delistings are more harmful to firm value if the focal party is a manufacturer (versus a retailer) or the initiator of the delisting. They also harm firm value more when more brands were delisted and when the size of the focal firm is much larger than the opponent’s size. A conflict delisting is more beneficial if the focal party has a strong brand and if the opponent’s brand strength is weak.

制造商和零售商之间的谈判经常失败。为了坚持自己的立场，公司越来越多地行使强制力并决定将产品退市，直到冲突得到解决。通过一项事件研究，本文提供了有关这些所谓的冲突退市的绩效影响的知识。虽然结果表明，平均而言，冲突退市会严重损害公司价值，但股市反应的方向和幅度取决于冲突和公司特征。如果焦点方是制造商（相对于零售商）或退市的发起者，则冲突退市对公司价值的损害更大。当更多的品牌被摘牌并且焦点公司的规模远大于对手的规模时，它们也会对公司价值造成更大的损害。