In recent years, a variety of philosophers have argued that the fundamental bearers of representational properties like truth are concrete particulars produced by cognitive agents–representational vehicles (“RVs”), as I will call them. This view apparently conflicts with other judgments that are part of our common sense understanding of truth. For instance, it is plausible that there are truths about the Milky Way that have and never will never be articulated by anyone. Whatever these truths are, it looks like they cannot be RVs, because an RV is articulated just in case it exists. In this paper, I argue that it is consistent to hold that the fundamental truth-bearers are representational vehicles, while also acknowledging the existence of unarticulated truths. I argue that truth is a property that derivatively holds of kinds of RVs, that these provide the basis for our judgments that there are unarticulated truths, and I defend the view against putative counter-examples.

近年来，各种哲学家都认为，像真理这样的表征属性的基本载体是由认知主体产生的具体细节——表征工具（“RV”），我将称之为它们。这种观点显然与我们对真理的常识性理解中的其他判断相冲突。例如，关于银河系的真相似乎有道理，而且永远不会被任何人阐明。不管这些事实是什么，看起来它们都不可能是 RV，因为 RV 只是以防万一它存在。在本文中，我认为坚持基本的真理承载者是表征工具是一致的，同时也承认未阐明的真理的存在。我认为真理是一种衍生出各种 RV 的属性，