The emerging technology of Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) communication over vehicular ad hoc networks promises to improve road safety by allowing vehicles to autonomously warn each other of road hazards. However, research on other transportation information systems has shown that informing only a subset of drivers of road conditions may have a perverse effect of increasing congestion. In the context of a simple (yet novel) model of V2V hazard information sharing, we ask whether partial adoption of this technology can similarly lead to undesirable outcomes. In our model, drivers individually choose how recklessly to behave as a function of information received from other V2V-enabled cars, and the resulting aggregate behavior influences the likelihood of accidents (and thus the information propagated by the vehicular network). We fully characterize the game-theoretic equilibria of this model using our new equilibrium concept. Our model indicates that for a wide range of the parameter space, V2V information sharing surprisingly increases the equilibrium frequency of accidents relative to no V2V information sharing, and that it may increase equilibrium social cost as well.

基于车辆自组的车对车 (V2V) 通信的新兴技术网络有望通过允许车辆自动相互警告道路危险来改善道路安全。然而，对其他交通信息系统的研究表明，仅将道路状况告知一部分驾驶员可能会产生加剧拥堵的不利影响。在 V2V 危险信息共享的简单（但新颖）模型的背景下，我们询问部分采用该技术是否会同样导致不良结果。在我们的模型中，驾驶员根据从其他支持 V2V 的汽车接收到的信息单独选择行为的鲁莽程度，由此产生的总体行为会影响事故发生的可能性（以及车辆网络传播的信息）。我们使用新的均衡概念充分描述了该模型的博弈论均衡。