Abstract:

During the Cold War, US extended deterrence commitments mostly focused on deterring nuclear or strategic conventional attacks against allies in Europe and Asia. In the decades following the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, the emergence of new technologies and domains for conflict, particularly the cyber domain, prompted new thinking for alliance management and extended deterrence. In this article I explore how the system of US bilateral alliances and informal strategic groupings in the Indo-Pacific affects the crafting of allied cyber deterrence strategies in the region. Based on deterrence and alliance theory, I survey cyber threats faced by US allies and partners in the region and views of cyber deterrence to form a general framework of allied cyber deterrence strategy. The US-South Korea alliance is used as a case study for allied cyber deterrence strategy, with a special focus on the impact that South Korea assuming wartime operational control of allied military forces could have on cyber deterrence on the Korean Peninsula. Just as concepts of extended deterrence had to evolve, the cyber domain will force the United States and allies to reconceptualize peacetime and wartime operational control.

摘要：

冷战期间，美国扩大的威慑承诺主要集中在威慑对欧洲和亚洲盟友的核攻击或战略常规攻击。在 1990 年代初冷战结束后的几十年里，新技术和冲突领域，特别是网络领域的出现，引发了对联盟管理和扩大威慑的新思考。在这篇文章中，我探讨了印太地区美国双边联盟和非正式战略集团的体系如何影响该地区联盟网络威慑战略的制定。基于威慑与同盟理论，梳理美国在该地区的盟友和合作伙伴面临的网络威胁和网络威慑观点，形成盟国网络威慑战略的总体框架。美韩联盟被用作盟军网络威慑战略的案例研究，特别关注韩国在战时控制盟军部队对朝鲜半岛网络威慑的影响。正如扩展威慑的概念必须演变一样，网络领域将迫使美国及其盟友重新定义和平时期和战时的作战控制。