This paper argues that functionalist metasemantic views, such as Conceptual Role Semantics and Interpretivism, face a Euthyphro challenge. The challenge, put roughly, is this: functionalist metasemantic views reverse the order of explanation. According to such views, representational mental states have the contents that they do partly because they play certain roles in our mental lives. According to an intuitive picture of the roles that representational mental states play in our mental lives, however, these states play the roles they do partly because they have the contents that they do. Since explanations—even partial ones—are asymmetric (call this principle ‘the Euthyphro Principle’), we can't accept both this intuitive picture and a functionalist metasemantics. Hence, we should reject all versions of the latter. This paper can be seen as an attempt to better articulate an intuition that has been suggested in various forms in the literature. The paper proceeds as follows. First, it shows that functionalist metasemantic views imply certain ‘partly because’ claims. Second, it argues for the Euthyphro Principle. Third, it defends the intuitive picture of representational mental states and shows that it implies ‘partly because’ claims that conflict with those made by functionalist metasemantic views. Finally, it considers ways of relaxing the intuitive picture and finds them all wanting.

中文翻译：

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元语义学中的游绪弗罗挑战

本文认为，功能主义元语义观点，例如概念角色语义学和解释主义，面临着游绪弗罗的挑战。粗略地说，挑战是这样的：功能主义元语义观点颠倒了解释的顺序。根据这样的观点，表征性心理状态之所以具有它们所具有的内容，部分是因为它们在我们的心理生活中发挥着某些作用。然而，根据表征心理状态在我们的心理生活中所扮演的角色的直观描述，这些状态之所以能发挥其作用，部分原因是它们具有其所具有的内容。由于解释——即使是部分解释——是不对称的（将此原理称为“尤西弗罗原理”），我们不能同时接受这种直观的图景和功能主义的元语义学。因此，我们应该拒绝后者的所有版本。本文可以被视为更好地阐明文献中以各种形式提出的直觉的尝试。本文的进展如下。首先，它表明功能主义元语义观点暗示着某些“部分是因为”的主张。其次，它支持游绪弗罗原则。第三，它捍卫了表征心理状态的直观图景，并表明它暗示了与功能主义元语义观点相冲突的“部分原因”主张。最后，它考虑了放松直观画面的方法，并发现它们都令人满意。