Investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) stands alone in empowering shareholders to bring claims for shareholder reflective loss (SRL)—meaning claims over harms allegedly inflicted upon the company, but which somehow affect share value. National systems of corporate law and public international law regimes generally bar SRL claims for strong policy reasons bearing on the efficiency and fairness of the corporate form. However, ISDS tribunals allow shareholders broad and regular access to seek relief for reflective loss. The availability of SRL claims in ISDS ultimately harms States and investors alike, imposing surprise ex post costs on States and various corporate stakeholders (particularly creditors), and creating perverse incentives likely to raise the cost of doing business ex ante. The article sets out the harms caused by allowing ISDS claims for reflective loss, as well as the possible justifications for allowing such claims in this specific context. Concluding that any potential benefits of SRL can be realized through less invasive means, we then canvas a number of plausible reform options, with an eye to their trade-offs.

中文翻译：

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改革投资者与国家争端解决中的股东诉求

投资者与国家争端解决 (ISDS) 独自授权股东就股东反映损失 (SRL) 提出索赔——这意味着对据称对公司造成的损害提出索赔，但会以某种方式影响股票价值。公司法和国际公法制度的国家体系通常出于影响公司形式的效率和公平性的强有力的政策原因而禁止 SRL 索赔。然而，ISDS 法庭允许股东广泛和定期地寻求反射性损失的救济。ISDS 中 SRL 索赔的可用性最终会伤害国家和投资者，给国家和各种公司利益相关者（特别是债权人）带来意外的事后成本，并产生可能提高事前经营成本的不正当激励。该文章列出了允许 ISDS 对反射性损失提出索赔所造成的损害，以及在这一特定背景下允许此类索赔的可能理由。结论是 SRL 的任何潜在好处都可以通过侵入性较小的方式实现，然后我们研究了一些可能的改革方案，并着眼于它们的权衡。