The discussion about deep disagreement has gained significant momentum in the last several years. This discussion often relies on the intuition that deep disagreement is, in some sense, rationally irresolvable. In this paper, I will provide a theory of rationally irresolvable disagreement. Such a theory is interesting in its own right, since it conflicts with the view that rational attitudes and procedures are paradigmatic tools for resolving disagreement. Moreover, I will suggest replacing discussions about deep disagreement with an analysis of rationally irresolvable disagreement, since this notion can be more clearly defined than deep disagreement and captures the basic intuitions underlying deep disagreement. I will first motivate this project by critically assessing the current debate about deep disagreement. I then detail the notions of rationality and resolvable disagreement which are crucial for a suitable theory of rationally irresolvable disagreement before sketching various instances of rationally irresolvable disagreement. Finally, I argue for replacing theories of deep disagreement with theories of rationally irresolvable disagreement, an approach that has significant advantages over existing theories of deep disagreement which focus on hinge propositions or fundamental epistemic principles.

在过去的几年里，关于严重分歧的讨论势头强劲。这种讨论通常依赖于这样一种直觉，即在某种意义上，深刻的分歧在理性上是无法解决的。在本文中，我将提供一种理性上无法解决的分歧理论。这种理论本身很有趣，因为它与理性态度和程序是解决分歧的典型工具的观点相冲突。此外，我建议用对理性上无法解决的分歧的分析来代替对深度分歧的讨论，因为这个概念比深度分歧的定义更清晰，并且抓住了深度分歧背后的基本直觉。我将首先通过批判性地评估当前关于严重分歧的辩论来推动这个项目。然后，我详细介绍了合理性和可解决的分歧的概念，这些概念对于理性无法解决的分歧的合适理论至关重要，然后再概述理性无法解决的分歧的各种实例。最后，我主张用理性上无法解决的分歧理论取代深度分歧理论，这种方法比现有的专注于枢纽命题或基本认知原则的深度分歧理论具有显着优势。