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To acquire or compete? Government intervention in transportation under different route structures
Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review ( IF 8.3 ) Pub Date : 2023-02-22 , DOI: 10.1016/j.tre.2023.103033
Naqun Huang , Jaimie W. Lien , Jie Zheng

What is the ideal way for a government to regulate an existing transportation monopoly based on the structure of the transport market? We analyze the government’s regulatory problem from the perspective of two possible strategies: partially publicizing the existing monopolist, and entering the transport market directly as a competitor. In a model in which heterogeneous consumers are uniformly distributed in their valuation of transportation services while also considering both price and travel latency in their transport choice, we fully characterize the equilibrium under each of the two regulatory strategies under a serial or a parallel transport structure, respectively. The optimal policy depends on both the transport route structure and the government’s degree of intervention. Under a serial structure, the government can achieve the socially optimal traffic flow by entering the market as a competitor or fully acquiring the firm, while partial acquisition cannot achieve this goal. However, in a parallel structure, while direct duopoly competition cannot achieve a socially optimal result, direct competition can outperform partially publicizing the monopolist if the acquisition level is sufficiently low. We also consider asymmetric parallel route structures and joint design of both types of regulations. Our findings provide policy implications for governments interested in applying efficient regulatory policies under different transportation route structures.



中文翻译:

收购还是竞争?不同路线结构下政府对交通的干预

政府根据运输市场的结构来规范现有的运输垄断的理想方式是什么?我们从两种可能策略的角度分析政府的监管问题:部分公开现有的垄断者,以及作为竞争者直接进入运输市场。在一个模型中,异质消费者在他们对运输服务的估值中均匀分布,同时在他们的运输选择中同时考虑价格和旅行延迟,我们充分描述了串行或并行运输结构下两种监管策略中每一种策略下的均衡,分别。最优政策取决于运输路线结构和政府的干预程度。在串行结构下,政府可以通过作为竞争对手进入市场或完全收购企业来实现社会最优交通流量,而部分收购则无法实现这一目标。然而,在平行结构中,虽然直接双头垄断竞争无法实现社会最优结果,但如果收购水平足够低,直接竞争可以胜过部分公开垄断者。我们还考虑了非对称平行路线结构和两种法规的联合设计。我们的研究结果为有兴趣在不同运输路线结构下应用有效监管政策的政府提供了政策启示。虽然直接双头垄断竞争无法实现社会最优结果,但如果收购水平足够低,直接竞争可以胜过部分公开垄断者。我们还考虑了非对称平行路线结构和两种法规的联合设计。我们的研究结果为有兴趣在不同运输路线结构下应用有效监管政策的政府提供了政策启示。虽然直接双头垄断竞争无法实现社会最优结果,但如果收购水平足够低,直接竞争可以胜过部分公开垄断者。我们还考虑了非对称平行路线结构和两种法规的联合设计。我们的研究结果为有兴趣在不同运输路线结构下应用有效监管政策的政府提供了政策启示。

更新日期:2023-02-23
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