Knowledge implies the presence of a positive relation between a person and a fact. Factual ignorance, on the other hand, implies the absence of some positive relation between a person and a fact. The two most influential views of ignorance hold that what is lacking in cases of factual ignorance is knowledge or true belief, but these accounts fail to explain a number of basic facts about ignorance. In their place, we propose a novel and systematic defense of the view that factual ignorance is the absence of awareness, an account that both comes apart from the dominant views and overcomes their deficiencies. Given the important role that ignorance plays in moral and legal theory and our understanding of various epistemic injustices, a precise and theoretically unproblematic account of the nature of ignorance is important not only for normative epistemology, but also for law, ethics, and applied epistemology.

中文翻译：

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无知和意识

知识意味着人与事实之间存在积极的关系。另一方面，事实无知意味着人与事实之间缺乏某种积极的关系。两种最有影响力的无知观点认为，事实上的无知所缺乏的是知识或真正的信念，但这些观点未能解释有关无知的一些基本事实。取而代之的是，我们提出了一种新颖而系统的辩护观点，即事实上的无知是缺乏意识, 一个既有别于主流观点又能克服其不足的说法。鉴于无知在道德和法律理论中的重要作用以及我们对各种认知不公正的理解，对无知本质的精确和理论上无问题的解释不仅对规范认识论很重要，而且对法律、伦理学和应用认识论也很重要。