This paper studies linear cost-efficiency and quality incentives that are increasingly being used to regulate electricity and gas network utilities. The analysis shows that cost and quality incentives have asymmetric impacts on firms’ choices of efficiency and quality, and that the incentive powers should be equal and less than maximal when there is information asymmetry about firm costs and a dislike for network utility surplus. As in most existing regulations quality incentives have a higher power than cost-efficiency incentives, the model predicts that supplied quality is too high. Finally, the paper discusses examples of linear sliding-scale incentive regulation in Norway and Great Britain. The findings of this study provide guidance for regulators and policymakers looking to optimally use linear incentives to regulate energy network utilities.

本文研究了越来越多地用于监管电力和天然气网络公用事业的线性成本效率和质量激励措施。分析表明，成本和质量激励对企业的效率和质量选择具有不对称影响，当企业成本信息不对称且不喜欢网络效用盈余时，激励权力应该相等且小于最大值。由于在大多数现有法规中，质量激励措施比成本效益激励措施具有更高的权力，因此该模型预测供应质量过高。最后，本文讨论了挪威和英国线性滑尺激励监管的例子。本研究的结果为寻求最佳使用线性激励来监管能源网络公用事业的监管机构和政策制定者提供了指导。