Cryptographic schemes are often deployed in microgrids to protect communication security. However, most existing schemes widely used in microgrids cannot ensure forward secrecy and non-repudiation under key leakage and dishonest insiders. Although some existing cryptographic techniques can theoretically overcome these vulnerabilities, their computational complexity may significantly extend the communication latency, making them less suitable for the time-sensitive microgrid control scenario. In this paper, a novel cryptographic scheme is proposed to guarantee not only confidentiality and integrity but also forward secrecy and non-repudiation of microgrid control communications. Built from key-evolving symmetric encryption and online/offline signature, the scheme can efficiently run in embedded controllers with limited computational resources. The security of the scheme is analyzed in the paper, with a recommended instantiation given through comprehensive comparisons of candidate cryptographic algorithms. Besides, the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed scheme are tested on a microgrid model through cyber-physical co-simulation.

中文翻译：

---

一种有效的加密方案，用于在密钥泄露和不诚实的内部人员的情况下保护时间敏感的微电网通信


微电网中经常部署密码方案来保护通信安全。然而，大多数广泛应用于微电网的现有方案无法确保在密钥泄露和不诚实的内部人员情况下的前向保密性和不可否认性。尽管一些现有的密码技术理论上可以克服这些漏洞，但其计算复杂性可能会显着延长通信延迟，使其不太适合时间敏感的微电网控制场景。本文提出了一种新颖的密码方案，不仅保证微电网控制通信的机密性和完整性，而且保证前向保密性和不可否认性。该方案基于密钥演化对称加密和在线/离线签名构建，可以在计算资源有限的嵌入式控制器中高效运行。文中对该方案的安全性进行了分析，通过对候选密码算法的综合比较，给出了推荐的实例。此外，通过信息物理联合仿真在微电网模型上测试了所提出方案的有效性和效率。