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The Invention and Re-invention of Meta-ethics
The Journal of Value Inquiry ( IF 0.545 ) Pub Date : 2023-02-18 , DOI: 10.1007/s10790-023-09935-8
Anders Hee Nørbjerg Poulsen , Anne-Marie Søndergaard Christensen

In this article we pose three questions: 1) What are the questions that gave rise to the introduction of the concept and subdiscipline of meta-ethics? 2) What characterises the view of meta-ethics as a subdiscipline of moral philosophy? And 3) is it in fact possible to uphold a systematic distinction between normative moral philosophy and meta-ethics in a way that allows us to see these two aspects of moral philosophy as independent subdisciplines? In trying to answer these questions, we trace two different roads in the shaping of the current understanding of meta-ethics: the introduction of the word in analytical moral philosophy and the characterisation of meta-ethics in the formative period of meta-ethics and in contemporary introductions. Among the characteristics ascribed to meta-ethics, we identify a special focus on normative neutrality, and we furthermore show that this idea of neutrality as the defining characteristic of meta-ethics cannot be upheld. Our aim is to show that meta-ethics cannot be characterised or construed in a way that is normatively neutral and independent of other work done in normative ethics. We therefore challenge the claim that meta-ethics makes up a subdiscipline that is independent of other work done in moral philosophy. Instead, we suggest a reflective view of the relationship between meta-ethics and normative ethics, according to which we should acknowledge that meta-ethics is inherently normative, and that meta-ethical questions are interwoven with normative questions in moral philosophy.



中文翻译:

元伦理学的发明和再发明

在这篇文章中,我们提出了三个问题:1)引入元伦理学的概念和分支学科的问题是什么?2)元伦理学作为道德哲学的一个分支学科的特征是什么?3)事实上是否有可能以一种允许我们将道德哲学的这两个方面视为独立的子学科的方式来维护规范道德哲学和元伦理学之间的系统区分?在试图回答这些问题时,我们追溯了塑造当前对元伦理学理解的两条不同道路:在分析道德哲学中引入这个词,以及在元伦理学形成时期和当代介绍。在归因于元伦理学的特征中,我们确定了对规范中立性的特别关注,而且我们进一步表明,不能坚持这种作为元伦理学定义特征的中立思想。我们的目的是表明元伦理学不能以一种规范中立且独立于规范伦理学中所做的其他工作的方式来表征或解释。因此,我们质疑元伦理学构成一个独立于道德哲学中所做的其他工作的分支学科的说法。相反,我们建议对元伦理学与规范伦理学之间的关系进行反思,根据这种观点,我们应该承认元伦理学本质上是规范性的,并且元伦理学问题与道德哲学中的规范问题交织在一起。我们的目的是表明元伦理学不能以一种规范中立且独立于规范伦理学中所做的其他工作的方式来表征或解释。因此,我们质疑元伦理学构成一个独立于道德哲学中所做的其他工作的分支学科的说法。相反,我们建议对元伦理学与规范伦理学之间的关系进行反思,根据这种观点,我们应该承认元伦理学本质上是规范性的,并且元伦理学问题与道德哲学中的规范问题交织在一起。我们的目的是表明元伦理学不能以一种规范中立且独立于规范伦理学中所做的其他工作的方式来表征或解释。因此,我们质疑元伦理学构成一个独立于道德哲学中所做的其他工作的分支学科的说法。相反,我们建议对元伦理学与规范伦理学之间的关系进行反思,根据这种观点,我们应该承认元伦理学本质上是规范性的,并且元伦理学问题与道德哲学中的规范问题交织在一起。

更新日期:2023-02-20
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