Some recent accounts of blameworthiness present this property as response-dependent: an agent is blameworthy, they say, if and only if, and (if so) in virtue of the fact that, it is fitting to respond to her with a certain blaming emotion. Given the explanatory aim of these views, the selected emotion cannot be said simply to appraise its object as blameworthy. We argue that articulation of the appraisal in other terms suggested by proponents yields a failure of the coextension required by the accounts. We then address the promise to explain why the conditions that render one blameworthy are as they are. According to proponents, these conditions render one blameworthy because they render fitting the selected emotion. But why do just these conditions do the latter? We find no good answer to this question from proponents of the accounts. While we do not contend that blameworthiness is response-independent, we are unconvinced that it is response-dependent.

中文翻译：

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可责备性和依赖性

最近一些关于可责备性的描述将此属性描述为依赖于反应的：他们说，当且仅当并且（如果是）由于以下事实，代理人是应责备的，以某种责备情绪回应她是合适的. 鉴于这些观点的解释目的，所选择的情绪不能简单地说是将其对象评价为应受谴责的。我们认为，用支持者建议的其他术语来表述评估会导致帐户所需的共同扩展失败。然后我们谈到应许，解释为什么使人应受责备的情况是这样的。根据支持者的说法，这些条件使一个人应该受到指责，因为它们使人适合所选择的情绪。但为什么只有这些条件会产生后者呢？我们从帐户的支持者那里找不到这个问题的好答案。