This paper applies a model in the real options framework to analyze the impacts of controlling shareholder’s share pledging on corporate investment timing and valuation. We find that the optimal investment timing shows an inverted U-shape with the pledge ratio, indicating that share pledging exacerbates firms’ over-investment and worsens firms’ under-investment. Furthermore, share pledging hurts firms’ option value unless active measures are taken to control the pledging risks. The maintenance requirement can keep controlling shareholder from irrational early investments and protect investors from severe wealth losses. In addition, our work can provide testable empirical implications.

本文运用实物期权框架下的模型，分析了控股股东股权质押对企业投资时机和估值的影响。我们发现最佳投资时机与质押率呈倒U型，表明股权质押加剧了企业的过度投资并加剧了企业的投资不足。此外，除非采取积极措施控制股权质押风险，否则股权质押会损害企业的期权价值。维持要求可以防止控股股东进行不合理的早期投资，并保护投资者免受严重的财富损失。此外，我们的工作可以提供可测试的实证意义。