In legal scholarship, as in other fields, it would seem that ‘choice-architecture’ (where states attempt to ‘move’ people toward desired behaviour) is everywhere. This paper argues that such blanket adoption of choice-architecture discourse cannot be based on generic terms, nor on imagined or assumed choices. Rather, I contend, the specific characteristics of each legal field – here, poverty law – should be considered when debating and reviewing choice-architecture. I point to the dangers of using choice-discourse in the context of poverty law, illuminate significant weaknesses in choice-architecture theory, and thus justify limitations on the use of incentives and nudges in this context. I propel the poverty-as-exception argument, advancing the development of poverty law toward being considered a distinct field of law. The contributions of this paper are thus both theoretical and normative, shifting focus onto those exposed to choice-architecture, and to the expressive harms caused by assuming choice where there is none.

中文翻译：

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选择与它有什么关系？解决贫困法中使用选择架构话语的陷阱

在法律学术领域，就像在其他领域一样，“选择架构”（国家试图“推动”人们走向期望的行为）似乎无处不在。本文认为，这种对选择架构话语的全面采用不能基于通用术语，也不能基于想象或假设选择。相反，我认为，在辩论和审查选择架构时，应该考虑每个法律领域（这里是贫困法）的具体特征。我指出了在贫困法背景下使用选择话语的危险，阐明了选择架构理论的重大弱点，从而证明了在这种情况下限制使用激励和助推的合理性。我推动贫困作为例外的论点，推动贫困法的发展，使其成为一个独特的法律领域。因此，本文的贡献既是理论性的，也是规范性的，将焦点转移到那些暴露于选择架构的人身上，以及在没有选择的情况下假设选择所造成的表达性伤害。