A foundationalist account of our empirical thinking divides propositions we accept into two classes, basic and derivative, and sees the warrant of derivative propositions as accruing to them through their derivation from basic propositions. Such an account needs to answer two questions: which propositions are basic, and whence do basic propositions acquire their warrant? A natural and ancient answer to these questions is that basic propositions are observational and that these propositions gain their warrant from perceptions. I critically examine this view and also a variant view offered by Wilfrid Sellars. I put forward an alternative conception, dialectical foundationalism, that sees the distinction between the basic and the derivative as issuing from a distinction between two kinds of reasoning, derivational and dialectical. This type of foundationalism provides a more accurate account of our empirical thinking, I argue, than its traditional and Sellarsian counterparts.

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基础主义与经验理性：论观察的理性意义

对我们经验思维的基础主义解释将我们接受的命题分为两类：基本命题和派生命题，并认为派生命题的依据是通过从基本命题派生而获得的。这样的解释需要回答两个问题：哪些命题是基本命题，以及基本命题从何获得其依据？对这些问题的一个自然而古老的答案是，基本命题是观察性的，并且这些命题从感知中获得其依据。我批判性地审视了这一观点以及威尔弗里德·塞拉斯提出的另一种观点。我提出了另一种概念，即辩证基础主义，它将基本和派生之间的区别视为派生和辩证两种推理之间的区别。我认为，这种类型的基础主义比传统的和塞拉斯主义的同行更准确地描述了我们的经验思维。