We show that analyst behavior changes in response to a randomly assigned shock that exogenously varies the timeliness and cost of accessing mandatory disclosures in the cross-section of investors: analysts reduce coverage and issue less optimistic, more accurate, less bold, and less informative forecasts. Our evidence indicates that analysts reduce a strategic component of their behavior: the changes are stronger among analysts with more strategic incentives like affiliated or retail-focused analysts. We conclude that mandatory disclosure can substitute for analyst information production, which is constrained by investors’ ability to verify forecasts using corporate filings.

中文翻译：

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公司披露会限制战略分析师的行为吗？

我们表明，分析师的行为会因随机分配的冲击而发生变化，这种冲击会外生地改变投资者跨部门强制披露的及时性和成本：分析师减少覆盖范围并发布不那么乐观、更准确、不那么大胆和信息量更少的预测. 我们的证据表明，分析师减少了他们行为的战略组成部分：这种变化在具有更多战略激励的分析师中更为强烈，例如附属分析师或专注于零售的分析师。我们得出结论，强制披露可以替代分析师信息制作，这受到投资者使用公司文件验证预测的能力的限制。