The goal of our paper is to demonstrate the potential effects of a tax on paying a ransom on the incentives of stakeholders involved: both the perpetrators (the attackers placing the ransomware) as well as the potential victim. We do think that there is a case for a ransom tax, but we do also realise that it is not easy to make that case, and hence we express this doubt in our title. A tax could stimulate ex ante cybersecurity and also (when price elasticity is not too low) reduce ex post ransom payments. In addition, a tax in combination with a smartly designed subsidy could have benefits.

中文翻译：

---

赎金税的棘手案例

我们论文的目的是证明对支付赎金征税对相关利益相关者激励的潜在影响：肇事者（放置勒索软件的攻击者）和潜在受害者。我们确实认为有征收赎金税的理由，但我们也确实意识到提出这个理由并不容易，因此我们在标题中表达了这种怀疑。税收可以刺激事前网络安全，并且（当价格弹性不太低时）减少事后赎金支付。此外，税收与精心设计的补贴相结合可能会带来好处。