This paper considers a supply chain structure where an incumbent and an entrant order a critical component sequentially from a common supplier. The incumbent introduces an innovative product whose innovation value is its private information, and the entrant strategically chooses to either imitate the incumbent’s innovation at a cost or introduce a regular product without imitation. The supplier can choose whether or not to leak the incumbent’s order quantity to the entrant. This paper theoretically investigates the interplay between information leakage and innovation imitation, and examines the impacts of information leakage on the channel entities. We find that the entrant always imitates the innovation when the imitation cost is low, and imitation benefits the supplier but damages the incumbent. In the absence of incumbent’s quantity distortion, the supplier is more likely to leak the information except when the entrant’s imitation cost is moderate and the imitation ability is strong; however, its willingness to abandon information leakage increases in the presence of quantity distortion. Different from previous studies, our results suggest that quantity distortion enables a win–win–win outcome for supply chain members, all of whom have consistent preferences on information leakage. Besides, an information sharing agreement can be achieved between the incumbent and the entrant, which is beneficial to the supplier as well.

本文考虑了一种供应链结构，在这种结构中，在位者和进入者依次从共同供应商处订购关键组件。在位者推出一种创新产品，其创新价值是其私有信息，进入者战略性地选择要么有成本地模仿在位者的创新，要么在不模仿的情况下引入常规产品。供应商可以选择是否将在位者的订单数量泄露给进入者。本文从理论上研究了信息泄露与创新模仿之间的相互作用，并考察了信息泄露对渠道实体的影响。我们发现进入者总是在模仿成本低的时候模仿创新，模仿有利于供应商但损害了在位者。在没有现任者的数量扭曲的情况下，除非进入者的模仿成本适中且模仿能力强，否则供应商更容易泄露信息；然而，在数量失真的情况下，其放弃信息泄漏的意愿增加。与之前的研究不同，我们的结果表明，数量失真为供应链成员带来了双赢的结果，所有成员都对信息泄漏有一致的偏好。此外，在位者和进入者之间可以达成信息共享协议，这对供应商也是有利的。与之前的研究不同，我们的结果表明，数量失真为供应链成员带来了双赢的结果，所有成员都对信息泄漏有一致的偏好。此外，在位者和进入者之间可以达成信息共享协议，这对供应商也是有利的。与之前的研究不同，我们的结果表明，数量失真为供应链成员带来了双赢的结果，所有成员都对信息泄漏有一致的偏好。此外，在位者和进入者之间可以达成信息共享协议，这对供应商也是有利的。