Intentional action is, in some sense, non-accidental, and one common way action theorists have attempted to explain this is with reference to control. The idea, in short, is that intentional action implicates control, and control precludes accidentality. But in virtue of what, exactly, would exercising control over an action suffice to make it non-accidental in whatever sense is required for the action to be intentional? One interesting and prima facie plausible idea that we wish to explore in this paper is that control is non-accidental in virtue of requiring knowledge—either knowledge-that or knowledge-how (e.g., Beddor and Pavese 2021; cf., Setiya 2008; 2012 and Habgood-Coote 2018). We review in detail some key recent work defending such knowledge-centric theories of control, and we show that none of these accounts holds water. We conclude with some discussion about how control opposes the sort of luck intentional action excludes without doing so by requiring knowledge (that- or how).

在某种意义上，有意的行为是非偶然的，行为理论家试图解释这一点的一种常见方式是参考控制。简而言之，这个想法是有意的行为牵涉到控制，而控制排除了偶然性。但是，确切地说，凭什么对一个行为实施控制足以使其在任何意义上都不是偶然的，而该行为是有意的呢？我们希望在本文中探索的一个有趣且表面上看似合理的想法是，由于需要知识，控制是非偶然的— knowledge-that 或 knowledge-how（例如，Beddor 和 Pavese 2021；参见 Setiya 2008；2012 和 Habgood-Coote 2018）。我们详细回顾了近期捍卫这种以知识为中心的控制理论的一些重要工作，我们表明这些说法都站不住脚。最后，我们讨论了控制如何反对那种运气，有意的行动通过要求知识（那个或如何）排除而不这样做。