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Alethic Rights and Alethic Pluralism in Libraries
Libri ( IF 0.667 ) Pub Date : 2023-01-12 , DOI: 10.1515/libri-2022-0030
Riccardo Ridi 1
Affiliation  

The concept of truth, although unavoidable, is very problematic from a philosophical point of view and, in the field of librarianship, it is even more disputed for various reasons: inapplicability to libraries’ collections and reference services; scarcity of resources necessary in the event of a possible application; conflict with the value of intellectual neutrality. The “alethic rights” proposed by D’Agostini in 2017, pertinent to truth claims in social contexts, can be interpreted in two ways: the “strong” way is not applicable to libraries because it would lead to the same problems caused by the research of the truthfulness of each document preserved by libraries and of any information provided by their reference services; the “weak” way would instead be applicable to libraries, but it is more appropriate not to apply this either, both because there would be the risk that it could be interpreted in the strong way, and because its application would still be redundant compared to what already happens in libraries and to what, if necessary, could be obtained in emergency situations by applying instead the principle of social responsibility. In the library field it would be more sensible and useful to apply, instead of alethic rights, the epistemological theory of “alethic pluralism” by Wright (1992). Truth and Objectivity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press and Lynch (2009). Truth as One and Many. Oxford: Clarendon, which defines the concept of truth in a way compatible with technical practices and with deontological rules currently more widespread in libraries.

中文翻译:

图书馆中的 Alethic 权利和 Alethic 多元化

真理的概念虽然不可避免,但从哲学的角度来看是非常有问题的,在图书馆领域,由于各种原因,它的争议更大:不适用于图书馆的馆藏和参考服务;在可能的应用程序中缺乏必要的资源;与知识分子中立的价值相冲突。D'Agostini 于 2017 年提出的与社会背景下的真理主张相关的“道德权利”可以有两种解释:“强”方式不适用于图书馆,因为它会导致与研究造成的相同问题图书馆保存的每份文件及其参考服务提供的任何信息的真实性;“弱”方式反而适用于图书馆,但也不适用更合适,一方面是因为存在以强方式解释它的风险,另一方面是因为与图书馆中已经发生的事情相比,它的应用仍然是多余的,如果有必要,可以通过应用原则在紧急情况下获得的东西的社会责任。在图书馆领域,应用 Wright (1992) 的“alethic pluralism”认识论理论而不是 althic rights 会更明智和有用。真实与客观. 剑桥:哈佛大学出版社和林奇 (2009)。一与多的真理. 牛津:Clarendon,它以与技术实践和目前在图书馆中更为普遍的义务论规则兼容的方式定义了真理的概念。
更新日期:2023-01-12
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