Using novel merger valuation data, we show that firms selected by investment banks as “comparable peers” are more than twice as likely to later become takeover targets themselves compared to matched control firms. Peer firms not subsequently acquired attract more institutional ownership and analyst coverage, deliver strong operating performance, reduce investments, and increase payouts. Investors are inattentive, though, to peer identification at the time of merger filings’ public disclosure. A portfolio that longs peers and shorts controls earns up to 15.6% alpha annually, which mainly comes from the long leg and is difficult to explain by short-sale constraints.

中文翻译：

---

合并估值中被忽视的同行

我们使用新颖的合并估值数据表明，与匹配的控制公司相比，被投资银行选为“可比同行”的公司自身成为收购目标的可能性是后者的两倍多。随后未被收购的同行公司吸引了更多的机构所有权和分析师覆盖范围，提供了强劲的经营业绩，减少了投资，并增加了支出。不过，在合并申请公开披露时，投资者并没有注意到同行的身份。多头同行和空头控制的投资组合每年可赚取高达 15.6% 的 alpha，这主要来自多头，很难用卖空约束来解释。