While a large literature studies the various tools of autocratic survival, targeting opposition actors with austerity measures in electoral autocracies is hitherto understudied. This paper argues that the COVID-19 pandemic has provided a rare opportunity for Hungary’s Fidesz party to disarm opposition parties via cutting off resources of municipalities led by opposition mayors and eliminating any remnants of local governments’ fiscal autonomy. Analysing original data from government decrees on local transfers, this study contributes to the existing literature by conceptualising fiscal strangulation as part of electoral authoritarian regimes’ toolbox to discredit opposition parties and their ability to govern locally.

中文翻译：

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将反对党的扼杀掩盖为大流行反应：针对匈牙利地方层面的紧缩措施

虽然大量文献研究了专制生存的各种工具，但迄今为止，针对选举专制中的反对派采取紧缩措施的研究不足。本文认为，COVID-19 大流行病为匈牙利的青民盟提供了难得的机会，可以通过切断反对派市长领导的市政资源并消除地方政府财政自主权的任何残余来解除反对党的武装。通过分析政府关于地方转移支付的法令的原始数据，本研究通过将财政扼杀概念化为选举威权政权工具箱的一部分来诋毁反对党及其地方治理能力，从而为现有文献做出贡献。