Non-naturalists realists about morality face the challenge of explaining the supervenience of the moral facts on the natural facts. An influential recent suggestion, developed by Scanlon (2014) and Fogal and Risberg (2020), is that the non-naturalist can easily explain supervenience by appealing to explanatory moral principles, or metaphysical laws. The idea is that the general moral principles are necessary and so trivially supervene on the natural facts, while the particular moral facts are explained by the general, necessary, moral principles and the natural facts so they supervene on the natural facts too. I argue that such a strategy is unsuccessful. Either it (i) fails to explain supervenience because it doesn’t correctly identify the difference-makers for supervenience, or it (ii) does explain supervenience, but only by postulating another striking fact—and it cannot give a satisfactory explanation of this fact that properly identifies the difference-makers. Making sense of supervenience is one of the key challenges for a non-naturalist metaphysics of modality. Views based on moral principles look like they fail this challenge. Consequently, the non-naturalist should look to other metaphysical machinery to develop their view.

非自然主义者的道德现实主义者面临着解释道德事实对自然事实的随附性的挑战。Scanlon (2014) 和 Fogal 和 Risberg (2020) 提出的一个有影响力的近期建议是，非自然主义者可以通过诉诸解释性道德原则或形而上学法则来轻松解释随附性。这个想法是，一般的道德原则是必要的，因此微不足道地伴随着自然事实，而特定的道德事实是由一般的、必然的道德原则和自然事实来解释的，所以它们也伴随着自然事实。我认为这样的策略是不成功的。要么它 (i) 无法解释随附性，因为它没有正确识别随附性的差异制造者，或者它 (ii) 确实解释了随附性，但只能通过假设另一个引人注目的事实——它不能对正确识别差异制造者的这一事实给出令人满意的解释。理解随附性是非自然主义形而上学的主要挑战之一。基于道德原则的观点似乎无法应对这一挑战。因此，非自然主义者应该寻求其他形而上学机制来发展他们的观点。