Costly signaling theory indicates that highly visible acts of public generosity and display, which exact costs not easily recouped, can provide social benefits to those engaged in such acts. Such signaling is associated with the strength or fitness of the provider. Costly signaling has been implicated by archaeologists in the rise of complex societies. But costly signaling theory, with modifications proposed in the article, might equally apply to theorizing political collapse and the regeneration of complex societies thereafter. This article explores how Maya elites and rural sub-elites engaged in costly signaling and modified their actions by cost shifting and cost masking, which significantly transformed their signaling behavior. The material culture media assessed for signaling are architecture, slipped and fineware ceramics, and obsidian in display contexts. The case study focuses on the Petén Lakes region of Guatemala from the Late Classic to Early Postclassic periods (AD 600-AD 1250).

代价高昂的信号理论表明，高度可见的公众慷慨和展示行为，其确切成本不易收回，可以为从事此类行为的人提供社会福利。这种信号与提供者的力量或健康有关。考古学家认为复杂社会的兴起与昂贵的信号传递有关。但代价高昂的信号理论，加上文章中提出的修改，可能同样适用于理论化政治崩溃和此后复杂社会的复兴。本文探讨了玛雅精英和农村亚精英如何参与代价高昂的信号传递，并通过成本转移和成本掩蔽来改变他们的行为，从而显着改变了他们的信号传递行为。用于信号评估的物质培养基是建筑、滑动和精细陶瓷，和黑曜石在显示上下文中。该案例研究的重点是从古典晚期到后古典早期（公元 600 年至公元 1250 年）的危地马拉佩滕湖地区。