The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) played a key role in U.S.-Soviet relations in the early 1970s. This article reassesses some aspects of the SALT process in the light of important evidence that has become available in recent years. The key question is whether U.S. policy in the SALT negotiations was rooted in strategic stability theory—that is, in the idea that both major powers should work out an arrangement that would guarantee the survivability and effectiveness of both sides’ strategic nuclear forces, thereby reducing whatever incentive either of them might have to strike first in a crisis. The notion that U.S. policy on SALT was rooted in that theory is essentially a myth—although a myth that had important political consequences. The SALT process of the 1970s, as shaped by decisions made during the administration of Richard M. Nixon, helped pave the way for the hardening of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union in the early 1980s—scarcely the result supporters of nuclear arms control had been hoping for a decade earlier.

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尼克松-基辛格时期的美国与战略军备限制：构建稳定的国际体系？

战略武器限制会谈 (SALT) 在 20 世纪 70 年代初期的美苏关系中发挥了关键作用。本文根据近年来获得的重要证据重新评估了 SALT 过程的某些方面。关键问题在于，美国在 SALT 谈判中的政策是否植根于战略稳定理论——即两个大国应制定一项能够保证双方战略核力量的生存能力和有效性的安排，从而减少无论他们中的任何一个有什么动机，都必须在危机中先发制人。美国关于 SALT 的政策植根于该理论的观点本质上是一个神话——尽管这个神话具有重要的政治后果。1970 年代的 SALT 过程，由理查德·尼克松 (Richard M. Nixon) 执政期间做出的决定所塑造，