This paper studies the effect of deposit insurance on depositor behavior. Our theoretical framework integrates insights from public and financial economics and predicts that (1) deposit insurance induces bunching at the threshold in the deposit distribution and (2) an increase in the insurance threshold promotes deposit growth, particularly higher for individuals bunching at the initial limit. We exploit a large and unexpected increase in the Colombian insurance together with monthly depositor-level records from a major bank to test these predictions. We validate the existence of bunching in deposits and quantify the heterogeneous effect of deposit insurance on individual deposit growth.

中文翻译：

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存款保险和存款人行为：来自哥伦比亚的证据

本文研究存款保险对存款人行为的影响。我们的理论框架整合了公共经济学和金融经济学的见解，并预测 (1) 存款保险会在存款分布的门槛处引发聚束，以及 (2) 保险门槛的提高会促进存款增长，尤其是对于个人而言，在初始限额处聚束会更高. 我们利用哥伦比亚保险的大幅意外增长以及一家主要银行的每月存款人水平记录来检验这些预测。我们验证了存款聚集的存在，并量化了存款保险对个人存款增长的异质性影响。