The standard conception of misleading evidence has it that e is misleading evidence that p iff e is evidence that p and p is false. I argue that this conception yields incorrect verdicts when we consider what it is for evidence to be misleading with respect to questions like whether p. Instead, we should adopt a conception of misleading evidence according to which e is misleading with respect to a question only if e is in-fact irrelevant to that question – a relation that requires that e fail to be both explanatorily connected to and evidence for any truth that answers the question. This modified conception allows e to be non-misleading evidence with respect to a question even if e is evidence for the false answer to that question. It also points toward a new argument for and explanation of the truth of a central premise – what Maria Lasonen-Aarnio dubs “Entitlement” – that generates the infamous dogmatism puzzle.

中文翻译：

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权利和误导性证据

误导性证据的标准概念是，e是p的误导性证据，当且仅当e是p和p为假的证据。我认为，当我们考虑什么是证据在诸如p是否存在等问题上具有误导性时，这种概念会产生错误的结论。相反，我们应该采用误导性证据的概念，根据该概念，只有当 e 实际上与某个问题无关时，e 才会对某个问题产生误导——这种关系要求e既不能与任何问题有解释性联系，也不能为任何问题提供证据。回答问题的真理。这种修改后的概念允许e成为关于某个问题的非误导性证据，即使e是该问题错误答案的证据。它还指出了对一个中心前提的真实性的新论证和解释——玛丽亚·拉索南-阿尼奥称之为“权利”——这产生了臭名昭著的教条主义难题。