This paper asks when a natural disease kind is truly ‘reactive’ and when it is merely associated with a corresponding social kind. I begin with a permissive account of real kinds and their structure, distinguishing natural kinds, indifferent kinds and reactive kinds as varieties of real kind characterised by super-explanatory properties. I then situate disease kinds within this framework, arguing that many disease kinds prima facie are both natural and reactive. I proceed to distinguish ‘simple dependence’, ‘secondary dependence’ and ‘essential dependence’ between a natural kind and its classification, and argue that a natural kind is only really reactive, in an important sense, under conditions of essential dependence. On this basis, I offer a principled hypothesis for why psychiatric kinds may be more metaphysically unstable than paradigm somatic disease kinds.

本文询问自然疾病种类何时真正“反应性”以及何时仅与相应的社会种类相关。我从对真实类及其结构的宽容解释开始，将自然类、冷漠类和反应类区分为具有超解释特性的真实类的变体。然后我将疾病种类置于这个​​框架内，认为许多疾病种类表面上都是自然的和反应性的。我继续区分自然类及其分类之间的“简单依赖”、“次要依赖”和“本质依赖”，并论证自然类仅在重要意义上仅在本质依赖的条件下才是真正的反应。以这个为基础，