In the debate over the existence of composite objects, it is sometimes suggested that perceptual evidence justifies belief in composite objects. But it is almost never suggested that we are perceptually justified in believing in composite objects on the basis of the fact that the phenomenology of our perceptual experiences enables us to discriminate between situations where there are composite objects and situations where there are merely simples arranged composite object-wise. But while the thought that the phenomenology of our perceptual experiences cannot enable us to discriminate between situations where there are composite objects and situations where there are merely simples arranged composite object-wise is commonly taken for granted, it requires some defence, both in light of its importance in shaping the debate and in light of its recently coming under attack by a prominent philosopher of perception. In this paper, I offer such a defence.

中文翻译：

---

感官知觉和分体虚无主义

在关于复合物体存在的争论中，有时有人认为感知证据证明了对复合物体的信念。但是几乎从来没有人认为我们在知觉上相信复合物体是基于这样一个事实的，即我们感知经验的现象学使我们能够区分存在复合物体的情况和仅存在简单排列的复合物体的情况-明智的。但是，虽然我们的感知体验的现象学不能使我们区分存在复合对象的情况和仅存在简单排列的复合对象的情况的想法通常被认为是理所当然的，但它需要一些辩护，既考虑到它在塑造辩论中的重要性，也考虑到它最近受到一位著名的感知哲学家的攻击。在本文中，我提供了这样的辩护。