We show that distortion in the size distribution of banks around regulatory thresholds can be used to identify costs of bank regulation. We build a structural model in which banks can strategically bunch their assets below regulatory thresholds to avoid regulations. The resultant distortion in the size distribution of banks reveals the magnitude of regulatory costs. Using U.S. bank data, we estimate the regulatory costs imposed by the Dodd-Frank Act. Although the estimated regulatory costs are substantial, they are significantly lower than banks’ self-reported estimates.

中文翻译：

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观察他们做了什么，而不是他们说了什么：根据显示的偏好估算监管成本

我们表明，围绕监管阈值的银行规模分布的扭曲可用于确定银行监管成本。我们建立了一个结构模型，在该模型中，银行可以战略性地将其资产集中在监管门槛以下以避免监管。由此导致的银行规模分布的扭曲揭示了监管成本的规模。使用美国银行数据，我们估算了多德-弗兰克法案强加的监管成本。尽管估计的监管成本很高，但远低于银行自行报告的估计。