This paper develops a positive role for accounting conservatism in fostering relational contracts between two agents in a two-period model of moral hazard. Building on Kreps (1996), the principal in our model designs a conservative measurement system and optimal contracts to create multiple equilibria that foster a team-based corporate culture. Accruals introduced by conservatism increase each agent's stake in the future of the relationship when it matters most—when it is going badly. This makes staying in the relationship worthwhile for the agents, even if they plan to play a low payoff equilibrium in the second period to punish first-period free-riding. In turn, this allows the principal to use lower-powered (and less costly) team incentives in the first period of the relationship. In contrast, deferred compensation increases each agent's stake in the future of the relationship when it is going well, making it less efficient in fostering relationships.

本文阐述了会计稳健性在两阶段道德风险模型中促进两个代理人之间的关系契约方面的积极作用。我们的模型以 Kreps（1996）为基础，设计了保守的测量系统和最优合同，以创建多重均衡，从而培育基于团队的企业文化。保守主义引入的权责发生制增加了每个代理人在关系的未来最重要的时候——当关系进展不顺利时——的赌注。这使得维持这种关系对于代理人来说是值得的，即使他们计划在第二阶段发挥低收益均衡来惩罚第一阶段的搭便车行为。反过来，这允许委托人在关系的第一阶段使用动力较低（且成本较低）的团队激励措施。相比之下，