A long line of epistemologists including Sosa (Epistemic explanations: a theory of telic normativity, and what it explains. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2021), Feldman (The ethics of belief. Philos and Phenomenol Res 60:667–695, 2002), and Chisholm (Theory of knowledge, 2nd edn. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 2007) have argued that, at least for a certain class of questions that we take up, we should (or should aim to) close inquiry iff by closing inquiry we would meet a unique epistemic standard. I argue that no epistemic norm of this general form is true: there is not a single epistemic standard that demarcates the boundary between inquiries we are forbidden and obligated to close. In short, such norms are false because they are insensitive to the potentially ambitious epistemic goals that agents may permissibly bring to bear on an inquiry. Focusing particularly on knowledge-oriented versions of the norm, I argue that beliefless ignorance has a positive role to play in epistemic life by licensing prolonged inquiry into questions that we especially care about.

一长串认识论学家，包括 Sosa（认知解释：目的规范性理论及其解释。牛津大学出版社，牛津，2021 年）、Feldman（信仰伦理学。Philos and Phenomenol Res 60:667–695, 2002）和 Chisholm（知识论，第 2 版，Prentice-Hall，Englewood Cliffs，2007 年）认为，至少对于我们处理的某一类问题，我们应该（或应该旨在）关闭调查，如果关闭查询我们将满足一个独特的认知标准。我认为没有这种一般形式的认知规范是正确的：没有一个单一的认知标准来划定我们被禁止和有义务关闭的查询之间的界限。简而言之，此类规范是错误的，因为它们对代理人可能允许对调查产生影响的潜在雄心勃勃的认知目标不敏感。