In this paper, I argue that the following claims are jointly inconsistent: (1) that an agent’s justification for belief, if it’s constituted by evidence, depends on the profile of her background beliefs, (2) that whether or not a group believes a proposition is solely dependent on whether the proposition is jointly accepted by its members, and (3) that prototypical group beliefs are justified. I also raise objections to attempts to resolve the tension by retaining (2) and (3). The upshot is a novel objection to the Joint Acceptance Account of group belief since it seems to be accompanied by a kind of skepticism.

中文翻译：

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关于群体背景信念

在这篇论文中，我认为以下主张是共同不一致的：（1）代理人对信念的辩护，如果它是由证据构成的，取决于她的背景信念的概况，（2）一个群体是否相信一个命题完全取决于该命题是否被其成员共同接受，以及（3）原型群体信念是否合理。我还反对通过保留 (2) 和 (3) 来解决紧张局势的尝试。结果是对集体信仰的联合接受说明提出了新的反对意见，因为它似乎伴随着一种怀疑主义。