The security issue is of the fundamental importance for cyber–physical systems (CPSs) due to the vulnerability to cyber attacks. In this article, an active interdiction defence scheme is proposed as an extra safeguard against the strategic false data-injection (FDI) attacker. To tackle the coupling between the decision-making processes of the FDI attacker and the active interdiction defence scheme, a framework of dynamic Stackelberg game is formulated to characterize the hierarchical interaction due to their asymmetric information structures. Subsequently, the Stackelberg strategies of both players are constructed. Furthermore, a sufficient condition is derived to guarantee asymptotic stability of the closed-loop system with the FDI attack and the active interdiction defence scheme. Finally, two simulation examples are provided to illustrate the correctness and effectiveness of the proposed active interdiction defence scheme.

中文翻译：

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针对虚假数据注入攻击的主动拦截防御方案：Stackelberg 博弈视角


由于容易受到网络攻击，安全问题对于网络物理系统（CPS）至关重要。在本文中，提出了一种主动拦截防御方案，作为针对战略性虚假数据注入（FDI）攻击者的额外防护措施。为了解决 FDI 攻击者决策过程与主动拦截防御方案之间的耦合问题，制定了动态 Stackelberg 博弈框架来表征由于信息结构不对称而导致的分层交互。随后，构建了两个参与者的 Stackelberg 策略。此外，还推导了保证FDI攻击和主动拦截防御方案闭环系统渐近稳定性的充分条件。最后，提供两个仿真例子来说明所提出的主动拦截防御方案的正确性和有效性。