The entry of transportation network companies like Uber and Lyft in the ride-hailing market has generated concerns that they unfairly compete against traditional street-hail services. However, regulatory action seeking to address this issue has either been lacking or has resulted in the suspension or restriction of e-hail services. In this paper, we propose a model of competition between these two services and investigate the design of optimal and parsimonious regulation to achieve social efficiency. When the e-hailing platform adopts instantaneous matching with a relatively large matching radius, we analytically show that, absent restrictions, the street-hailing firm has a pricing advantage and can thrive when competing against the e-hailing platform in dense markets or when trip distances are relatively short. Moreover, while a monopolist controlling both firms will tend to internalize some of its congestion externality, we show that congestion can become quite severe in a duopoly setting. However, we show that even when accounting for competition and congestion, regulators only need to regulate the per trip commission that each company earns to maximize social surplus. This provides a potential avenue to simplify the host of regulations, which have historically been a feature of the ride-hailing market and are currently hampering the street-hailing industry.

优步和 Lyft 等交通网络公司进入乘车市场引起了人们的担忧，即它们与传统的街头叫车服务存在不公平竞争。然而，旨在解决此问题的监管行动要么缺乏，要么导致电召车服务暂停或受限。在本文中，我们提出了这两种服务之间的竞争模型，并研究了优化和简约监管的设计以实现社会效率。当网约车平台采用匹配半径较大的即时匹配时，我们分析表明，在没有限制的情况下，街车公司具有定价优势，并且在密集市场或出行时与网约车平台竞争时可以蓬勃发展距离相对较短。而且，虽然控制两家公司的垄断者倾向于将其拥塞外部性的一部分内部化，但我们表明，在双头垄断环境下拥塞会变得相当严重。然而，我们表明，即使考虑到竞争和拥堵，监管机构也只需要监管每家公司赚取的每次旅行佣金即可实现社会盈余最大化。这为简化大量法规提供了一个潜在途径，这些法规历来是网约车市场的一个特征，目前正在阻碍街道网约车行业。监管机构只需规范每家公司赚取的单程佣金，即可实现社会盈余最大化。这为简化大量法规提供了一个潜在途径，这些法规历来是网约车市场的一个特征，目前正在阻碍街道网约车行业。监管机构只需规范每家公司赚取的单程佣金，即可实现社会盈余最大化。这为简化大量法规提供了一个潜在途径，这些法规历来是网约车市场的一个特征，目前正在阻碍街道网约车行业。