Prior literature does not provide a clear prediction of how executive confidence affects the degree to which a firm engages in “myopic marketing management,” the tendency to decrease current marketing spending to mitigate any potential earnings shortfall. We propose that highly confident CEOs are more likely to cut marketing spending to raise current earnings numbers because they believe in their ability to generate high future firm earnings that can cover the long-term losses arising from their current short-term actions. The effect is heightened when the board of directors is more independent and monitors more, but attenuated if CMOs are more confident and thus are better able to convince their CEOs and boards of directors to support continued investments in marketing. The moderating impact of CMO confidence is proposed to be stronger as the CMO becomes more powerful. Using secondary data from a broad cross-section of firms, we provide robust empirical support for our model. Our results highlight situations in which CMOs need to be wary of cuts to their marketing budget, and also provide a potential mechanism through which marketers can protect their budget in the presence of highly confident CEOs—through their own confidence levels.

先前的文献没有明确预测高管信心如何影响公司参与“近视营销管理”的程度，即减少当前营销支出以缓解任何潜在收入短缺的趋势。我们建议高度自信的 CEO 更有可能削减营销支出以提高当前收益数字，因为他们相信自己有能力在未来产生高额公司收益，以弥补当前短期行动造成的长期损失。当董事会更加独立和监督更多时，效果会增强，但如果首席营销官更有信心，从而能够更好地说服他们的首席执行官和董事会支持继续投资营销，效果就会减弱。当 CMO 变得更强大时，CMO 信心的调节作用会更强。使用来自广泛的公司横截面的二手数据，我们为我们的模型提供了强有力的实证支持。我们的结果强调了 CMO 需要警惕削减营销预算的情况，并且还提供了一种潜在机制，营销人员可以通过该机制在高度自信的 CEO 面前保护他们的预算——通过他们自己的信心水平。