This paper argues that we should solve paradoxes for propositions (such as the Russell–Myhill paradox) in essentially the same way that we solve Russellian paradoxes for sets. That is, the standard, iterative approach to sets is extended to include properties, and then the resulting hierarchy of sets and properties is used to construct propositions. Propositions on this account are structured in the sense of mirroring the sentences that express them, and they would seem to serve the needs of philosophers of language and metaphysicians who rely on such propositions. The resulting account has limitations, comparable to those faced by the iterative approach to sets, but it is argued to be in important ways preferable to others that have been proposed.

本文认为，我们应该以与解决集合的罗素悖论基本相同的方式来解决命题的悖论（例如 Russell–Myhill 悖论）。也就是说，集合的标准迭代方法被扩展到包括属性，然后集合和属性的结果层次结构用于构造命题。由于这个原因，命题的结构是在反映表达它们的句子的意义上，它们似乎可以满足依赖这些命题的语言哲学家和形而上学家的需要。由此产生的解释具有局限性，与集合的迭代方法所面临的局限性相当，但它被认为在重要方面优于已提出的其他方法。