ABSTRACT

Climate policy has entered a new era as public investment is increasingly moving to center stage, including recovery spending and long-term climate investment plans. While essential for decarbonization, public investment is not enough – the carrots of investment need to go hand in hand with regulatory sticks. Public investment in clean technologies and infrastructure does not guarantee decarbonization outcomes. Yet, climate regulation, particularly high and comprehensive carbon prices, has remained elusive in the United States and many other parts of the world. Against this backdrop, the big public investment push offers a political opportunity of government leverage. Governments can tie climate requirements to public investment as part of a 'green bargain.’ At the core of these arrangements is reciprocity – linking carrots to sticks – to ensure public investment leads to technological change and emission reductions. Drawing on the experience with ‘reciprocal control mechanisms’ in public investment among late industrializers, this paper advances our understanding of green bargains. It examines the historical precedents of green bargains, introduces a typology, and offers an empirical overview based on an original dataset of implemented and proposed green bargains. We then focus on the design choices related to leverage, scope, and accountability to make green bargains effective at technological learning and advancing decarbonization. The article concludes with a discussion of US and international policy fora that can serve as platforms to develop green bargains as public climate investments expand.

• Key policy insights

• Scaling public investment for decarbonization is essential but not sufficient. Climate regulation needs to complement investment to ensure decarbonization outcomes. Yet governments, in particular the US, are falling short of needed climate regulation.

• Public investment offers leverage to tie climate requirements to government spending on clean technology and infrastructure.

• Linking carrots to sticks represents a ‘green bargain’ between governments and firms and industries, with reciprocity at its core. This resembles the ‘reciprocal control mechanisms’ of late industrializers.

• To make green bargains effective, their design needs to facilitate broad scope, high government leverage, and high accountability.

摘要

随着公共投资越来越多地成为中心舞台，包括复苏支出和长期气候投资计划，气候政策进入了一个新时代。虽然公共投资对于脱碳至关重要，但还不够——投资的胡萝卜需要与监管大棒齐头并进。对清洁技术和基础设施的公共投资并不能保证脱碳结果。然而，气候监管，尤其是高额和全面的碳价格，在美国和世界许多其他地区仍然难以捉摸。在这种背景下，大规模的公共投资推动提供了政府杠杆的政治机会。作为“绿色交易”的一部分，政府可以将气候要求与公共投资联系起来。这些安排的核心是互惠——胡萝卜加大棒——以确保公共投资带来技术变革和减排。借鉴后工业化国家在公共投资中“互惠控制机制”的经验，本文加深了我们对绿色交易的理解。它考察了绿色交易的历史先例，介绍了一种类型，并根据已实施和拟议的绿色交易的原始数据集提供了实证概述。然后，我们关注与杠杆、范围和责任相关的设计选择，以使绿色交易在技术学习和推进脱碳方面有效。文章最后讨论了美国和国际政策论坛，随着公共气候投资的扩大，这些论坛可以作为制定绿色交易的平台。

• 关键政策见解

• 扩大脱碳公共投资是必要的，但还不够。气候监管需要补充投资以确保脱碳成果。然而，各国政府，尤其是美国政府，未能进行必要的气候监管。

• 公共投资提供了将气候要求与政府在清洁技术和基础设施方面的支出联系起来的杠杆作用。

• 胡萝卜加大棒代表了政府与企业和行业之间的“绿色交易”，其核心是互惠。这类似于晚期工业化者的“相互控制机制”。

• 为了使绿色交易有效，他们的设计需要促进广泛的范围、高政府杠杆和高度问责制。