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How does manufacturer’s self-operating channel interact with platform retailer’s E-commerce brand introduction?
Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review ( IF 8.3 ) Pub Date : 2022-11-23 , DOI: 10.1016/j.tre.2022.102951
Jie Wei , Zeling Xu

With an increasing number of platform retailers introducing e-commerce brands (EBs), national brands (NBs) manufacturers choose to open self-operating channels as anti-entry tools for fighting against EB introduction. Motivated by this observation, we investigate the interaction and timing of firms’ e-commerce brand introduction and self-operating channel opening in a coopetitive supply chain with a platform retailer and an NB manufacturer, who is the platform retailer’s upstream cooperator and downstream competitor. Using game theory, we give and analyze the equilibrium results of six different scenarios, which characterize the platform retailer’s strategies about whether and which quality of EB should be introduced and the manufacturer’s strategies about whether to open the self-operating channel. Our results show that when the platform retailer is a first-mover, his optimal EB introduction strategy depends on the platform fee, consumers’ self-operating channel preferences, the NB’s quality, and the manufacturer’s self-operating strategy. When the manufacturer is a first-mover, the platform retailer is best to introduce a higher-quality EB irrespective of the manufacturer’s self-operating strategy. Furthermore, the manufacturer prefers the platform retailer to concentrate on her NB’s sale rather than introduce an EB in most cases, and the self-operating channel as an anti-entry approach to the platform retailer’s EB introduction is effective in some scenarios.



中文翻译:

厂商自营渠道如何与平台零售商电商品牌导入互动?

随着越来越多的平台零售商引入电子商务品牌(EB),民族品牌(NB)制造商选择开放自营渠道作为对抗EB引入的反进入工具。受此观察的启发,我们调查了企业在与平台零售商和 NB 制造商(平台零售商的上游合作者和下游竞争对手)的竞争供应链中的电子商务品牌引入和自营渠道开放的相互作用和时机。运用博弈论,我们给出并分析了六种不同情景下的均衡结果,表征了平台零售商是否引入、引入何种质量的电子商务的策略,以及制造商是否开通自营渠道的策略。我们的结果表明,当平台零售商是先行者时,其最优的 EB 引入策略取决于平台费用、消费者的自营渠道偏好、NB 的质量以及制造商的自营策略。当制造商是先发者时,无论制造商的自营策略如何,平台零售商最好引入更高质量的EB。此外,在大多数情况下,制造商更希望平台零售商专注于其NB的销售而不是引入EB,而自营渠道作为平台零售商引入EB的反进入方式在某些场景下是有效的。以及制造商的自营策略。当制造商是先发者时,无论制造商的自营策略如何,平台零售商最好引入更高质量的EB。此外,在大多数情况下,制造商更希望平台零售商专注于其NB的销售而不是引入EB,而自营渠道作为平台零售商引入EB的反进入方式在某些场景下是有效的。以及制造商的自营策略。当制造商是先发者时,无论制造商的自营策略如何,平台零售商最好引入更高质量的EB。此外,在大多数情况下,制造商更希望平台零售商专注于其NB的销售而不是引入EB,而自营渠道作为平台零售商引入EB的反进入方式在某些场景下是有效的。

更新日期:2022-11-23
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