Tarski's hierarchical solution to the Liar paradox is widely viewed as ad hoc. In this paper I show that, on the contrary, Tarski's solution is justified by a sound philosophical principle that concerns the inner structure of truth. This principle provides a common philosophical basis to a number of solutions to the Liar paradox, including Tarski's and Kripke's. Tarski himself may not have been aware of this principle, but by providing a philosophical basis to his hierarchical solution to the paradox, it undermines the ad-hocness objection to this solution. Indeed, it contributes to the defense of Tarski's theory against other objections as well.

塔斯基对说谎者悖论的分层解决方案被广泛认为是临时的。在这篇论文中，我表明，恰恰相反，塔斯基的解决方案是由一个关于真理的内在结构的可靠哲学原则证明的。这一原则为说谎者悖论的许多解决方案提供了共同的哲学基础，包括塔斯基和克里普克的。塔斯基本人可能并没有意识到这一原则，但通过为他对悖论的分层解决方案提供哲学基础，它破坏了对该解决方案的临时反对。事实上，它也有助于为塔斯基的理论辩护以对抗其他反对意见。