We consider a model of oligopolistic competition in a market with search frictions, in which competing firms with products of unknown quality advertise how much information a consumer’s visit will glean. In the unique symmetric equilibrium of this game, the countervailing incentives of attraction and persuasion yield a payoff function for each firm that is linear in the firm’s realized effective value. If the expected quality of the products is sufficiently high (or competition is sufficiently fierce), this corresponds to full information: firms provide the first-best level of information. If not, this corresponds to information dispersion: firms randomize over signals.

中文翻译：

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吸引力与说服力：搜索市场中的信息提供

我们考虑具有搜索摩擦的市场中的寡头垄断竞争模型，其中产品质量未知的竞争公司宣传消费者的访问将收集多少信息。在这个博弈的独特对称均衡中，吸引和说服的抵消激励为每个公司产生了一个与公司实际有效价值成线性关系的收益函数。如果产品的预期质量足够高（或竞争足够激烈），这对应于完整信息：公司提供的信息水平最高。如果不是，这对应于信息分散：公司对信号进行随机化。