We develop a theory of collective brand reputation for markets in which product quality is jointly determined by local and global players. In a repeated game of imperfect public monitoring, we model collective branding as an aggregation of quality signals generated in different markets. Such aggregation yields a beneficial informativeness effect for incentivizing the global player. It however also induces harmful free-riding by local, market-specific players. The resulting trade-off yields a theory of optimal brand size and revenue sharing that applies to platform markets, franchising, licensing, umbrella branding, and firms with team production.

中文翻译：

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集体品牌声誉

我们为产品质量由本地和全球参与者共同决定的市场开发了集体品牌声誉理论。在不完善的公共监督的重复游戏中，我们将集体品牌建模为不同市场产生的质量信号的集合。这种聚合产生了有益的信息效应，可以激励全球参与者。然而，它也会导致当地特定市场参与者的有害搭便车行为。由此产生的权衡产生了适用于平台市场、特许经营、许可、伞形品牌和团队生产的公司的最佳品牌规模和收益分享理论。