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No Work for Fundamental Facts
The Philosophical Quarterly ( IF 1.1 ) Pub Date : 2022-11-12 , DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqac071
Thomas Oberle 1
Affiliation  

Metaphysical foundationalists argue that without fundamental facts, we cannot explain why there exist any dependent facts at all. Thus, metaphysical infinitism, the view that chains of ground can descend indefinitely without ever terminating in a level of fundamental facts, allegedly exhibits a kind of explanatory failure. I examine this argument and conclude that foundationalists have failed to show that infinitism exhibits explanatory failure. I argue that explaining the existence of dependent facts in terms of further dependent facts ad infinitum is unproblematic by arguing for the plausibility of a ground-theoretic version of the Hume-Edwards Principle, which states that if each fact in a plurality of facts has a ground, then the plurality itself has a ground.

中文翻译:

没有基本事实的工作

形而上学基础主义者认为,没有基本事实,我们根本无法解释为什么存在任何依赖事实。因此,形而上学的无限主义,即基础链可以无限下降而不会终止于基本事实水平的观点,据称表现出一种解释性的失败。我研究了这个论点并得出结论,基础主义者未能证明无限主义表现出解释性失败。我通过论证休谟-爱德华兹原理的基础理论版本的合理性来论证,用无限的更多从属事实来解释从属事实的存在是没有问题的,它指出,如果多个事实中的每个事实都有一个地,那么复数本身就有了地。
更新日期:2022-11-12
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